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Non-technical summary 
The change in the business model of venture capitalists from investing locally towards investing 
across borders started to intensify in the late 1990s. Compared to domestic investments, cross-border 
investments are likely to be associated with higher transaction and information costs. The reason for 
this is that venture capital is typically invested in opaque risky ventures where information 
asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists are particularly pronounced and 
which therefore require intensive pre-investment screening, post-investment hands-on management 
support and control. Nevertheless, there are at least two potential benefits that might outweigh the 
higher costs of investing across borders. By crossing borders, venture capitalists are able to exploit 
return differences between their home country and the portfolio companies’ countries. But even if 
return differences were absent, venture capitalists might invest abroad in order to diversify their 
portfolios geographically and to reduce their country-specific risks.  
In this paper we study the economic determinants of cross-border and domestic venture capital 
investments. A better understanding of the determinants behind domestic and cross-border venture 
capital investments is interesting to academics as well as to policy makers since cross-border venture 
capital inflows may compensate for potential limits in the domestic venture capital supply. We use a 
European and North-American country dataset and start by simultaneously analyzing how economic 
determinants shape domestic venture capital investments (i.e., when the venture capitalist is located 
in the same country as the portfolio company) and gross cross-border venture capital inflows (i.e., 
when the venture capitalist is located outside the country under focus). We find that countries with 
higher patent counts have a higher number of domestic investments as well as gross cross-border 
inflows than countries with lower patent counts. Countries with higher expected economic growth have 
a higher number of gross cross-border inflows than countries with low growth prospects. In addition, 
countries with viable stock markets have more domestic investments and are more successful in 
attracting investments from foreign venture capitalists than countries with unviable stock markets. 
We continue by investigating whether venture capital inflows compensate for potential limits in the 
domestic venture capital supply and analyze net cross-border venture capital inflows for country pairs. 
We define net cross-border inflows as the gross cross-border inflows attracted by the i-country 
portfolio companies from the k-country venture capitalists minus the gross cross-border outflows, 
which i-country venture capitalists invest into k-country portfolio companies. Our results indicate that 
countries with higher expected growth and lagged stock market returns receive larger net cross-border 
inflows. Moreover, a higher stock market capitalization and a more favorable environment for venture 
capital intermediation lead to lower net cross-border inflows. These finding may indicate that venture 
capitalists located in countries with viable stock markets can raise funds at more favorable conditions 
and venture capitalists located in countries with attractive tax and legal environments for venture 
capital intermediation have incentives to invest their funds in jurisdictions with less favorable tax and 
legal conditions. Thus, net cross-border inflows compensate limits in the local venture capital supply.  
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Ende der 1990er verstärkten Venture-Capital (VC) Investoren ihre ausländischen Investitionen. Im 
Vergleich zu den inländischen Investitionen dürften ausländische Investitionen mit höheren 
Transaktionskosten und Informationskosten verbunden sein, da die Informationsasymmetrien 
zwischen den Unternehmern und Investoren besonders stark ausgeprägt sind, und deshalb eine vor 
der stattfindenden Investition zeitaufwendige Auswahlphase, und nach erfolgter Investition eine 
zeitintensive Unterstützung und Überwachung des Managements durch den Investor erfordern. Es 
gibt jedoch mindestens zwei Vorteile, die diese mit ausländischen Investitionen verbundenen höheren 
Kosten kompensieren können. Beim Überschreiten von Ländergrenzen können VC-Investoren 
Renditedifferenziale zwischen ihrem Heimatland und dem Land des Portfoliounternehmens 
ausnutzen. Auch wenn solche Renditedifferenziale nicht existieren, können VC-Investoren einen 
Anreiz haben, im Ausland zu investieren, um so ihr Portfolio geographisch zu diversifizieren und 
dadurch ihr Länderrisiko zu reduzieren.  
In diesem Forschungsaufsatz werden ökonomische Determinanten von ausländischen und 
inländischen VC-Investitionen untersucht. Ein besseres Verständnis der Determinanten von 
ausländischen und inländischen Investitionen ist dabei nicht nur für akademische Kreise, sondern 
auch für die wirtschaftspolitische Beratung interessant, da ausländische Investitionen potentielle 
Beschränkungen des inländischen VC-Angebotes aufweichen können. Die Analyse basiert auf einem 
Datensatz europäischer und nordamerikanischer Länder. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass mehr Patente 
in einem Land zu einer Steigerung der inländischen wie auch der ausländischen Investitionen führen. 
Ein höheres erwartetes Wachstum hilft ebenfalls, ausländische Investoren anzuziehen. Darüber 
hinaus haben Länder mit entwickelten Kapitalmärkten höhere inländische Investitionen und ziehen 
mehr ausländische Investoren an.  
Um Einblicke darüber zu gewinnen, ob VC-Zuflüsse mögliche Beschränkungen des inländischen 
Angebots aufweichen, werden anschließend Netto-VC-Zuflüsse auf Länderpaarebene betrachtet. 
Netto-VC-Zuflüsse werden dabei definiert als die Investitionen, die Portfoliounternehmen im Land i 
von Investoren aus dem Land k erhalten, abzüglich der Investitionen, die Portfoliounternehmen im 
Land k von Investoren aus dem Land i erhalten. Unsere Ergebnisse induzieren, dass Länder mit 
höheren erwartetem Wachstum und höheren Renditen im Kapitalmarkt höhere Netto-VC-Zuflüsse 
erhalten. Länder mit einer höheren Marktkapitalisierung und einem guten rechtlichen und steuerlichen 
Umfeld für VC-Intermediation, hingegen, haben geringere Netto-VC-Zuflüsse, d.h. VC-Investoren aus 
diesen Ländern investieren mehr im Ausland, als ausländische VC-Investoren in diesen Ländern. 
Diese Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass VC-Investoren in Ländern mit höherer Marktkapitalisierung 
das Kapital zu besseren Bedingungen aufnehmen können und dass ein attraktives rechtliches und 
steuerliches Umfeld VC-Investoren Anreize geben kann, im Ausland zu investieren. Unsere 
Ergebnisse unterstützen die These, dass Netto-VC-Zuflüsse aus dem Ausland Beschränkungen im 
inländischen VC-Angebot aufweichen können.  
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1 Introduction 
The change in the business model of venture capitalists from investing locally towards investing 
across borders started to intensify in the late 1990s (Aizenman and Kendall 2008). Compared to 
domestic investments, cross-border investments are likely to be associated with higher transaction 
and information costs (see, e.g., Wright et al. 2005, Cumming and Johan 2007a). The reason for this 
is that venture capital is typically invested in opaque risky ventures where information asymmetries 
between the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists are particularly pronounced and which therefore 
require intensive pre-investment screening, post-investment hands-on management support and 
control (see, e.g., Amit et al. 1998). Nevertheless, there are at least two potential benefits that might 
outweigh the higher costs of investing across borders. By crossing borders, venture capitalists are 
able to exploit differences in risk-adjusted expected returns between their home country and the 
portfolio companies’ countries, which may arise due to a better economic environment in foreign 
countries. But even if return differences were absent, venture capitalists might invest abroad in order 
to diversify their portfolios geographically and to reduce their country-specific risks.  
In this paper we study the economic determinants of cross-border venture capital investments. To 
complete the picture, we complement the analysis of cross-border flows by investigating domestic 
venture capital investments. Given the role of venture capital finance for the countries’ economic 
progress (see, e.g., a survey article by Strömberg 2009 summarizing its impact on economic growth, 
employment, innovative activity, company performance, etc.), it is vital to understand the geography of 
venture capital finance. A better understanding of the determinants behind domestic and cross-border 
venture capital investments is not only important to academics and practitioners but also to policy 
makers since, as we will show later, cross-border venture capital inflows may compensate for potential 
limits in the domestic venture capital supply. With the international dimension in venture capital 
finance, public policy becomes much more complex, as its actions do not only affect investments by 
domestic venture capitalists in domestic and foreign companies, but also foreign venture capitalists’ 
participation in this particular country. Therefore, public policy that aims at fostering local venture 
capital industries has to take into account the internationalization in venture capital finance.  
There is a long list of studies dealing with the determinants of domestic venture capital investments at 
the country level (see, e.g., Jeng and Wells 2000, Allen and Song 2005, Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe 2004, Da Rin et al. 2006, Armour and Cumming 2006). Some of these country analyses 
have been framed in a demand-supply framework, which we augment to a two-country case to study 
cross-border flows. In our two-country framework, cross-border venture capital flows are caused by 
expected return differences between the two countries. Expected return differences may result from 
economic determinants that shape either the venture capital demand or supply. Demand-specific 
determinants, such as the creativeness of entrepreneurs in the country, are supposed to give rise to a 
positive return differential on the side of the “creative” country, implying that venture capital finance 
flows from the “uncreative” country to the “creative” country. Supply-specific determinants, such as the 
tax and legal environment for venture capital intermediation, are conjectured to generate a positive 
return differential on the side of the “unfavorable-environment” country, implying that venture capital 
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finance flows from a country with a favorable environment to a country with an unfavorable 
environment. 
We use a European and North-American country dataset and start by simultaneously analyzing how 
economic determinants shape domestic venture capital investments (i.e., when the venture capitalist 
is located in the same country as the portfolio company) and gross cross-border venture capital 
inflows (i.e., when the venture capitalist is located outside the country under focus). We continue by 
investigating whether venture capital inflows compensate for potential limits in the domestic venture 
capital supply and analyze net cross-border venture capital inflows for country pairs. We define net 
cross-border inflows as the gross cross-border inflows attracted by the i-country portfolio companies 
from the k-country venture capitalists minus the gross cross-border outflows, which i-country venture 
capitalists invest into k-country portfolio companies.  
Our research adds to the findings of a rapidly growing number of studies dealing with the 
internationalization in venture capital finance. For instance, Aizenman and Kendall (2008) investigate 
how economic determinants, such as market capitalization, influence worldwide gross cross-border 
venture capital investments. Cumming and Johan (2007a, 2007b) analyze how venture capitalists 
raise funds from foreign investors. Kaplan et al. (2003) demonstrate that when investing abroad, deal 
contracts of venture capitalists located in civil law countries differ significantly from those of investors 
located in common law countries. Another strand of the literature analyzes motives behind cross-
border venture capital investments (e.g., Mäkelä and Maula 2006, Bruner and Chaplinsky 2002, 
Ribeiro et al. 2006, Dixit and Jayaraman 2001, Wright et al. 2005, Manigart et al. 2006), particularly 
from the perspective of the company that receives venture capital funding. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 employs a simple neoclassical supply-
demand framework as a tool to predict the direction of net cross-border venture capital flows. 
Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 investigates the determinants of domestic investments, 
gross cross-border inflows at a country level and, finally, net cross-border inflows at a country-pair 
level. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and concludes. 
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
To yield hypotheses on the impact of economic determinants on cross-border inflows, we use a simple 
neoclassical supply-demand model of a closed economy that we augment to a two-country setting, 
which allows us to analyze cross-border flows. In the closed economy the venture capital demand 
results from companies’ needs to finance investment projects with positive net present values. When 
the risk-adjusted expected return (hereafter referred to as expected return) required by the investors 
increases, companies demand a lower quantity of venture capital finance because fewer projects with 
positive net present values exist. Thus, the demand curve is downward sloping. The venture capital 
supply in the closed economy results from the willingness of limited partners, such as pension funds 
and insurance companies, to invest in this asset class, as well as from resources available in the 
country to set up and to manage venture capital funds (in particular human capital). At least two 
reasons exist why a higher quantity supplied has to go along with higher expected returns (i.e., the 
supply curve is upward sloping). First, if the capital gains of limited partners are subject to non-unique 
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tax rates, higher-taxed investors only provide capital for venture capital funds when they are 
compensated with a higher expected return (Gompers and Lerner 1998). Second, because fund 
managers need particular expertise to identify and structure promising deals, and because building up 
such expertise is costly and requires time, the availability of qualified managers increases only if the 
expected return rises. Panel a of Figure 1 visualizes the venture capital demand and supply in a 
closed economy. 
Several economic determinants are likely to affect the position of the demand curve in the 
expected return-quantity diagram. A higher technological creativeness (Ueda and Hirukawa 2008) and 
a higher expected growth (Armour and Cumming 2006, Gompers and Lerner 1998, Cumming and 
MacIntosh 2006) will go along with more entrepreneurs who demand venture capital finance to start-
up their companies and to finance their ideas. Moreover, a viable stock market will increase 
entrepreneurs’ demand for venture capital because it gives them the opportunity to enter into an 
implicit contract over control with the venture capitalist. Whereas the entrepreneurs’ control gets 
diluted after a trade sale, an initial public offering offers them the chance to at least partially reacquire 
control since the entrepreneurs can obtain leading management positions in the listed companies 
(Black and Gilson 1998, Bascha and Walz 2002). Further, capital gains tax rates will influence the 
decision to become an entrepreneur and thus the venture capital demand as Poterba (1989) shows 
within a theoretical model. Finally, the legal framework impacts the valuations and returns and is 
therefore supposed to shape the venture capital demand as well (Cumming and Walz 2009). For a 
country with a high and a low venture capital demand, respectively, Panel a of Figure 1 (left picture) 
depicts the expected return and the quantity of venture capital finance in equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, 
a higher demand implies a higher expected return for each quantity of venture capital finance.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Similarly, several economic determinants affect the position of the supply curve. The viability of the 
stock market is not only relevant for the demand, but also for the supply of venture capital because a 
viable stock market allows venture capitalists to build up a reputation by successfully exiting from their 
portfolio companies via an initial public offering. Venture capitalists may profit from this reputation by 
raising funds from limited partners at more favorable conditions (Gompers 1996). The position of the 
supply curve also depends on capital income taxes (see Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2002, 2004) and 
other elements of the fiscal environment relevant for venture capital intermediation, such as VAT on 
carried interest and management fees. High taxes on carried interest and management fees may 
destroy the managers’ incentives to select, monitor and support the portfolio companies. Moreover, 
the legal environment determines the quality of support that the venture capitalists offer their portfolio 
companies (Bottazzi et al. 2005), the structure of contracts and deal characteristics (Lerner and 
Schoar 2004), and the efficiency of project screening and deal origination (Cumming et al. 2009). For 
a country with a high and a low venture capital supply, respectively, Panel a of Figure 1 (right picture) 
depicts the return and the quantity of venture capital finance in a state of equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, 
a higher supply implies a lower expected return for each quantity of venture capital finance. 
To yield hypotheses on the determinants of cross-border flows we augment this simple demand-
supply model of a closed economy to a two-country framework; the two countries are assumed to be 
identical apart from either the demand or the supply. To exemplify what may drive cross-border 
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investments, let country i have a higher venture capital demand than country k. This case will be 
further illustrated in Panel b of Figure 1. In the absence of cross-border venture capital flows, the 
expected return is higher in country i (left picture) than in k (right picture). The positive expected return 
difference between the countries i and k, caused by differences in economic determinants that shape 
the venture capital demand, incentivizes venture capitalists from country k to invest in country i. In the 
absence of distorting factors, such as transaction and information costs, the expected returns and 
quantities would be equalized in both countries in the new equilibrium. However, distorting factors 
cannot be neglected in the context of venture capital. To invest across borders, higher expected 
returns abroad have to outweigh the costs, which are likely to be higher for cross-border than for 
domestic investments (e.g., Wright et al. 2005, Cumming and Johan 2007a). As a result, the return 
difference may decrease if cross-border flows take place, but are unlikely to disappear completely.  
Now, we turn to the venture capital supply and let country i, but not country k, have a favorable 
environment for the supply. This case is illustrated in Panel c of Figure 1. Without cross-border flows, 
the expected return is higher in country k (right picture) than in country i (left picture). The difference in 
the supply conditions generates an expected return difference that encourages cross-border flows 
from country i to k. Distorting factors may not only hinder an equalization of expected returns, but they 
may also affect the location decision of the venture capitalists (see Chen et al. 2009 on the latter). For 
example, differences in the tax and legal environment for venture capital intermediation, such as VAT 
on carried interest and management fees, may determine venture capitalists’ decisions on where to 
locate as well as where to invest.  
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H 1: Economic determinants that increase the venture capital demand (the creativeness and 
expected growth) 
 will increase domestic investments in country i.  
 will increase cross-border inflows that country i attracts from any other country. 
H 2: Economic determinants that increase the venture capital supply (tax and legal environment for 
venture capital intermediation) 
 will increase domestic investments in country i.  
 will decrease cross-border inflows that country i attracts from any other country. 
H 3: Economic determinants that increase the venture capital demand as well as the supply (stock 
market viability and the legal framework)  
 will increase domestic investments in country i.  
 will increase or decrease cross-border inflows that country i attracts from any other 
country.1 
                                                 
1  The demand and supply curves in country y {i,k} are given by: Dyyy bQAR   and Syyy dQCR   with 
d and b>0. Country i has a favorable, while k has a less favorable environment. A favorable environment leads 
to a higher demand and supply: Dki LAA   and Ski LCC  , where LD is the demand and LS the supply curve 
shift.  
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The discussion above is based on the conjecture that venture capitalists exploit differences in 
expected returns when they invest abroad. However, venture capitalists may invest abroad to diversify 
their portfolios geographically and to reduce country-specific risks. Venture capitalists’ diversification 
motives may result in cross-border flows even if differences in expected returns are absent and it may 
initiate venture capital flows in both directions, i.e., from country i to k and from country k to i, at the 
same time. Because of this diversification motive, gross cross-border inflows may not necessarily 
respond to expected return differences as formulated in our hypotheses. Therefore, we also analyze 
net cross-border inflows, which show whether a country “imports” or “exports” venture capital and 
which might therefore better reflect the exploitation of expected return differences. Our definition of net 
cross-border inflows differs from the one used in other studies on cross-border equity flows: Portes 
and Rey (2005), for example, focus on changes in portfolio positions, and calculate net cross-border 
flows as securities’ purchases of k-country companies by i–country citizens minus securities’ sales of 
k-country companies by i-country citizens.  
3 The data 
3.1 Data source for venture capital investments 
Data on domestic and cross-border venture capital investments stem from Zephyr database, offered 
by the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This information platform, initially aimed at M&A 
transactions, also conveys IPO and venture capital transaction data. For each transaction, besides the 
names of the target company and all investors, the Zephyr database contains a wide range of 
information on the participating parties, such as their countries of origin, parent companies, detailed 
business descriptions and industry affiliations.  
In our dataset we include deals from the Zephyr database that fulfill the following conditions. (i) The 
deal has one of the following types of financing: venture capital, private equity, angel investment, 
corporate venturing, or seed financing. (ii) The portfolio company is a non-financial company located in 
Europe or North America. (iii) The investors acquire a minority stake in the portfolio company. (iv) At 
least one investor from Europe or North America provides venture capital. To distinguish venture 
capitalists from other investors, we analyzed investors’ business descriptions and retained only those 
deals in which the business description of at least one investor included the terms “venture capital” or 
“private equity”. In some cases, the identity of the investor in Zephyr is indicated on the level of the 
fund, in other cases on the level of the venture capital company. Also, in case of dependent private 
equity companies, sometimes the parent company, whereas in other cases the subsidiary is indicated 
as the investor in a particular deal. We created a consistent pattern by using the information on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
For the equilibrium return without cross-border flows we obtain: 
bd
bCdA
R yyy 
* .  
A positive expected return difference between countries i and k requires: SD L
d
bL  .  
Whenever b>d, a positive expected return difference between i and k implies that the demand shift is larger 
than the supply shift.  
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ultimate parent of the venture capitalist.2 This procedure changed the relevant information on venture 
capitalists (country of origin) in 3 percent of the cases only.  
Besides a simple deal count, we also employ the aggregated volume of domestic investments and 
cross-border inflows. For approximately 80 percent of the deals, Zephyr obtains information on the 
total deal volume, which is the total volume invested in the portfolio company plus the volume 
eventually paid to the exiting shareholders. We approximate missing deal volumes by predicted 
volumes from a linear regression model using the deal and the deal country characteristics as RHS 
variables. More specifically, we include dummy variables for the country and the year of the deal, the 
industry affiliation of the portfolio company as well as the number of venture capitalists that 
participated in the deal. Almost all variables have a significant impact on the deal volume. However, 
with an adjusted R2 of about 30 percent, the explanatory power of the regression is moderate. 
Researchers working in the field of venture capital and private equity have recently started to account 
for the Zephyr database (e.g., Goossens et al. 2008, Abdesselam et al. 2008, Prijcker et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, it is useful to assess its completeness by comparing it with the data in other studies and 
other available databases. In the Zephyr database, we count a total of 38,125 domestic and cross-
border venture capital deals worldwide in the period 2000-2008. The most recent paper by Lerner et 
al. (2009) is based on the Capital IQ database and includes 45,207 venture capital and growth capital 
deals worldwide from 1984 to September 2008. Unfortunately, the paper does not provide information 
on the number of deals within the period 2000-2008 so that this dataset is not directly comparable to 
Zephyr database. The most widely used database in venture capital research, Thomson VentureXpert 
database, covers 38,515 companies when searching for worldwide targets involved in venture related 
deals within the period 2000-2008. Thus, the Zephyr coverage seems to be slightly inferior to that of 
Thomson. However, the huge advantage of Zephyr is that it offers better information on deal volume 
than Thomson. For our purpose this information is necessary because we need to calculate the 
volume of domestic investments and cross-border inflows.  
3.2 Dependent variables 
To calculate the number and volume of domestic investment and cross-border inflows at the country 
level as well as at the country-pair level, we were obliged to set some assumptions since many 
venture capital deals are syndicated, i.e. several domestic and/or foreign venture capitalists participate 
in the same deal. When at least one venture capitalist is located outside the portfolio company 
country, we define the deal as being a cross-border deal. Regarding the number of investments, each 
deal counts only once when all venture capitalists that participate in a deal are located in one country. 
                                                 
2  However, a noteworthy characteristic of the dataset is that parent company information in Zephyr is updated 
regularly, so that – relying only on the information indicated in the field “parent company” – we have not been 
able to trace back changes in the organizational structure. What is a drawback of this feature? Let investor A 
take over a share in the target company Z on January 1st 2004. If another investor B took over investor A on 
January 1st 2003, we would attribute the above mentioned deal to B, because B became A’s parent before the 
transaction had been conducted. However, if B took over A on January 1st 2005, the above deal is carried out 
by A, because at the date of the deal, A and B were independent. Using the parent information offered by 
Zephyr – we would falsely assign this deal to B because B is indicated as A’s parent. To correct this “mistake” 
we have checked (within the Zephyr deal database) whether all our investors were acquired or merged during 
our observation period. All deals before a potential acquisition or merger date (in the latter example January 
1st 2005) have been assigned to the original investor, all deals after this date to its parent company. 
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A deal counts more than once only if investors from different countries, e.g., the United Kingdom and 
France, invest in a portfolio company located outside their home countries, e.g. in Germany. For the 
investment volume, we divided the deal volume by the number of venture capitalists and assign the 
respective part-deal to the respective country and country pair. For example, when a German and a 
French venture capitalist jointly finance a deal in the United Kingdom, half the deal volume is assigned 
to Germany and the United Kingdom and the other half to France and the United Kingdom. 
For each of the 17 sample countries, Panel a of Table 1 provides information on the number and 
volume of domestic investments, i.e. those investments where the venture capitalist is located in the 
same country as the portfolio company, gross venture capital inflows that aggregate the investments 
financed by foreign venture capitalists from other European and North-American countries in the 
respective country and, for the sake of completeness, gross venture capital outflows that sum up the 
investments from the venture capitalists located in the respective country in other European and 
North-American countries. The volume of gross venture capital inflows and outflows indicates the 
importance of exchanging investment opportunities among venture capitalists, which may partly result 
from diversification efforts. Several of the countries in our sample have higher outflows than inflows, 
implying that they export venture capital finance to other countries. For example, Germany, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States originate much larger investment volumes in 
other countries than they attract from other countries. France and Italy, among others, have higher 
inflows than outflows and thus attract venture capital finance from foreign venture capitalists.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel b of Table 1 depicts the volumes of gross bilateral venture capital flows between each pair of 
our sample countries in both directions separately, i.e., investments of French venture capitalists in 
Germany appear in one category, and those of German venture capitalists in France in another 
category. It reveals some interesting geographical patterns in cross-border investments. Some 
countries have investment links with many other countries, while others have only one or a few 
investment links (i.e. many zeros). For example, venture capitalists located in the United Kingdom and 
the United States originate venture capital deals in all countries under focus and portfolio companies 
located in these two countries receive venture capital financing from all other countries. Some regional 
clusters do, however, also exist: For instance, Austrian venture capitalists invest intensively in German 
portfolio companies, while Finish venture capitalists are intensively involved in Swedish portfolio 
companies.  
Finally, Panel c of Table 1 depicts the volume of net bilateral venture capital inflows in our country-pair 
sample. We defined net bilateral inflows as the investments that portfolio companies located in 
country i receive from venture capitalists located in country k minus the investments that venture 
capitalists located in country i invest in portfolio companies located in country k. Net bilateral inflows 
are positive, when country i attracts more investments from k than it originates in country k, while they 
are negative when the country i originates more investments in k than it attracts from k. Panel c shows 
that some of the countries that attract more investments from abroad than the venture capitalists 
located in these countries invest abroad, such as France (as demonstrated in Panel a), do not have 
positive net bilateral inflows from all the other countries. For example, French portfolio companies 
receive 3,178 million Euros more from Belgian venture capitalists than French venture capitalists 
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invest in Belgian portfolio companies, while French portfolio companies receive 552 million Euros less 
from Italian venture capitalists than French venture capitalists invest in Italian portfolio companies.  
For our empirical analyses of domestic investments and cross-border inflows, we take into account 
that the countries in our sample vary substantially in size. Therefore, we normalize the domestic 
investments and cross-border inflows by the GDP. This normalization eliminates a bias towards 
findings of positive relationships between investments and economic determinants purely based on 
the country size. Since the normalized domestic investments and cross-border inflows are positively 
skewed (for example, the skewness is 1.82 for the normalized domestic investment volume and 1.45 
for the normalized cross-border inflows) we additionally use a log transformation (see, e.g., Dahl and 
Shrieves 1999). Panel a of Table 2 gives summary statistics and definitions of our dependent 
variables. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3 Determinants 
Our determinants capture several facets of the differences between countries that are likely to be 
correlated with the expected return differences and the costs for carrying out cross-border 
investments. We normalize all size-sensitive RHS variables with GDP. Panel b of Table 2 exhibits 
summary statistics, definitions and sources of our RHS variables. Correlations between RHS variables 
are depicted in Table 3: Panel a for the country-level dataset and Panel b for the country-pair dataset. 
In the country-pair dataset, all country-level RHS variables are employed in country-pair differences 
(defined as the value of a variable in country i minus the value of the variable in country k). 
We employ three demand-related variables. To capture the technological creativeness in a country, 
we use patent counts. We suppose that a country with a high number of patents in the past has more 
entrepreneurs coming up with innovative ideas which lead to a higher demand for venture capital 
finance (cf. Ueda and Hirukawa 2008). Moreover, we proxy demand conditions in the countries by 
expected economic growth and lagged stock market returns. Both expected growth and stock market 
returns are likely to enforce the venture capital demand (cf. Gompers and Lerner 1998, Cumming and 
MacIntosh 2006, Armour and Cumming 2006) as many attractive investment opportunities arise in 
high-growth and high-return countries.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The second set of variables which captures the viability of the stock market as well as the tax and 
legal environment is related to both the venture capital demand and supply. Corresponding to Portes 
and Rey (2005) among others, we employ the stock market capitalization to assess the viability of the 
stock markets. Following Armour and Cumming (2006), we use an indicator of the tax and legal 
environment pertinent to the venture capital demand and supply. This indicator comes from the 
Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments Reports conducted by the European Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) published in 2003, 2004, and 2006. The total score value (a 
higher value indicates a less favorable environment) from these reports combines information on (i) 
the quality of the tax and legal environment for fund managers and limited partners, such as pension 
funds and insurance companies, (ii) the environment for the portfolio companies, such as fiscal R&D 
 9
incentives for contracting researchers and technology transfer, (iii) and the environment for retaining 
talents in portfolio companies and management funds. This indicator combines many facets of the tax 
and legal environment into a single figure for each country and year, while other studies focus on 
particular fiscal variables, such as the capital gains taxation (e.g., Da Rin et al. 2006, Gompers and 
Lerner 1998) and/or various legal variables (Cumming and Walz 2009, Bottazzi et al. 2005, Lerner and 
Schoar 2004, Cumming et al. 2009). We do not use these general tax and legal indicators because 
they capture economy-wide characteristics, whereas our VC indicator is particularly designed to 
capture the tax and legal environment relevant for venture capital activity.  
Besides this VC indicator that is related to both the venture capital demand and supply, we construct 
another indicator that combines the tax and legal factors from the Benchmarking Reports that can be 
attributed to the venture capital supply only. This VC-supply indicator combines the information on the 
“funds structure” and “retaining talent in fund management companies”. More specifically, the indicator 
contains the following items: (i) Tax transparency for domestic investors: A fund structure is called tax 
transparent if the fund is not subject to taxation and taxation only applies at the limited partners’ level 
after gains and revenues have been distributed. The availability of a transparent fund structure is likely 
to play a decisive role because a tax on funds’ income diminishes the return to investors and lowers 
the quantity supplied. The item takes on a low value if the country has established a tax transparent 
investment vehicle’s structure and a high value otherwise. (ii) The ability to avoid VAT on management 
fees: The management fee is an annual management charge received by the management company 
of the fund. The item takes on a low value if the management fee is not subject to VAT and a high 
value otherwise. (iii) The ability to avoid VAT on carried interest: Carried interest, which typically 
constitutes 20 percent of the funds’ profits, is usually rendered payable when the limited partners have 
received repayment plus a minimum required rate of return (hurdle rate). The item takes on a low 
value if carried interest is exempted from VAT and a high value otherwise. (iv) Freedom from undue 
restrictions: The item takes on a low value if no restrictions severely affect venture capitalists’ 
investment decisions, while it takes on a high value when regulations restrict investment decisions in a 
negative way. (v) Taxation of carried interest: The item has a low value if carried interest is taxed as 
capital gains, it has a medium value if carried interest is taxed as dividends, and it has a high value if 
carried interest is taxed as income. Our VC-supply indicator averages these five items; a higher value 
of our indicator indicates a less favorable tax and legal environment for venture capital intermediation.  
Finally, we use three distinct measures to capture the cultural and geographical proximity between two 
countries formerly employed in the literature on international capital flows (e.g. Barron and Valev 
2000, Portes et al. 2001, Portes and Rey 2005 for equity flows; Buch 2003 for banks’ foreign asset 
holdings; Buch and DeLong 2004 for cross-border bank mergers). First, we create a dummy variable 
which is equal to one when the two countries have the same legal tradition. We distinguish between 
French, German, Scandinavian, and English law tradition. Second, we create a dummy variable equal 
to one when the same language is spoken in the two countries. This dummy variable is based on all 
official languages spoken in the two countries. Third, we use the log of the physical distance between 
the two countries.  
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3.4 Univariate tests 
We begin our analysis by testing whether domestic investments and cross-border inflows vary 
systematically along with our economic determinants. For each economic determinant of interest, we 
divide the sample into those countries that have high values in the respective determinant (above the 
median value of the sample population) and those countries that have low values (below the median). 
We then test whether the average number and volume of domestic investments and cross-border 
inflows differ between these two subsamples. We normalize the investment number and volume by 
country GDP and use a log transformation. 
Table 4 offers the results for domestic investments (Panel a) and gross cross-border inflows (Panel b) 
based on country data as well as for net cross-border inflows based on country-pair data (Panel c). 
The average investments vary systematically with expected growth, a variable that we believe to 
shape the demand. Countries with above-median values in expected growth have a higher number 
and volume of domestic investments, a higher number of gross cross-border inflows and a higher 
number and volume of net cross-border inflows than countries with below-median values. A positive 
value in net cross-border inflows indicates that the country attracts more investments from foreign 
venture capitalists than local venture capitalists originate abroad. Thus, countries with a strong venture 
capital demand, which we measure inter alia by expected growth, have more domestic investments 
and are more successful in attracting venture capitalists from other countries.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The average investment volume also varies systematically with the stock market capitalization and 
with the legal and fiscal indicator. Countries with above-median values in capitalization have 
significantly more domestic investments, higher gross cross-border inflows and lower net cross-border 
inflows than countries with below-median values in capitalization. More specifically, countries with 
above-median values in capitalization have net venture capital outflows (indicated by the negative 
average value), while countries with below-median values in capitalization realize net venture capital 
inflows (indicated by the positive average value). The average investment volume does not differ 
between countries with below and above-median values in the VC indicator, but they do differ with the 
VC-supply indicator. Countries with above-median values in the VC-supply indicator, which indicates a 
poor tax and legal environment for venture capital intermediation, have higher net cross-border inflows 
than countries with below-median values in the VC-supply indicator. This finding suggests that venture 
capital finance flows from jurisdictions with favorable tax and legal environment for venture capital 
intermediation to countries with poor environments. 
4 Econometric analyses 
4.1 Domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows at the country level 
Our econometric analyses start by investigating the determinants of venture capital investments at a 
country level. The determinants discussed in Section 2 should shape total venture capital investments 
which contain domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows in a given country. Thus, we have 
two dependent variables: domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows in country i and in 
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year t. We either use the investment number or volume that we normalize by country GDP and we use 
a log transformation. To minimize potential endogeneity of our RHS variables, we use their lagged 
values, except for expected growth. Additionally, we include country and year dummies. Since we 
have 17 countries in our sample, we include 16 country dummy variables; the reference country is the 
United States. We employ seemingly unrelated regression framework (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 7).  
Our estimation results, which we present in Table 5, suggest the following: In line with our first 
hypothesis, which deals with the impact of the demand-specific determinants, we find that countries 
with higher lagged patent counts have a significantly higher number of domestic investments than 
countries with lower patent counts. The economic effect of patent counts is, however, moderate in 
size: The transformed number of domestic investments, which is 4.2 on average (see Panel a of 
Table 2), increases by 0.36 when the patent counts increase by one-standard deviation. We also find 
that countries with higher patent counts have larger gross cross-border inflows. However, patent 
counts are only significant for the number but not for the volume of gross cross-border inflows. In 
addition, countries with higher expected growth have larger gross cross-border inflows. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Corresponding to our third hypothesis, which deals with the demand and supply-specific determinants, 
we find that the market capitalization significantly increases the number and volume of domestic 
investments. It also positively affects the gross cross-border inflows. The transformed number of 
domestic investments rises by 0.52 when the market capitalization increases by one-standard 
deviation. The transformed gross cross-border inflows (number) increase by 0.23 when the 
capitalization increases by one-standard deviation. A more favorable tax and legal environment 
(captured either by the VC indicator or the VC-supply indicator) does not affect the number and 
volume of domestic investments and gross inflows significantly. The reason for this might be that 
these indicators have little variation over time and that the full set of country dummy variables picks up 
differences in the tax and legal environment. We therefore experiment with alternative specifications 
(results not depicted, but available upon request): when we exclude all country dummy variables, the 
VC indicator has the expected negative and significant effect on domestic investments, while its effect 
on gross cross-border inflows remains insignificant. The VC-supply indicator affects domestic 
investments and gross cross-border inflows significantly negatively. We yield similar results when we 
exclude all country dummy variables that have correlation coefficients above 0.4 (see Panel a of 
Table 3).  
4.2 Net cross-border inflows by country pairs 
Since net cross-border inflows do not only depend on the characteristics of the portfolio-company 
country but also on the characteristics of the country in which the venture capitalists are located, we 
analyze net cross-border inflows by country pairs. Our dependent variables are the number and 
volume of net cross-border inflows calculated as the investments that portfolio companies located in 
country i attract from venture capitalists located in country k minus the investments venture capitalists 
located in country i originate in country k. Our dataset consists of 17x16=272 country pairs and nine 
years (2000-2008); in total we have 2,448 country-pair-year observations. In our analysis of net cross-
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border flows, however, we only use 136 country pairs and thus 1,224 country-pair-year observations, 
since net cross-border inflows are symmetrical (see Panel c of Table 1), i.e. the amount of positive net 
cross-border inflows from country i to k equals the amount of negative net cross-border inflows from 
country k to i.  
In Table 6 we present estimation results from alternative model specifications with respect to the 
inclusion of RHS variables. In line with our first hypothesis, the number and volume of net cross-
border inflows from country i to country k increase (more investments are attracted than are 
originated) when the difference in expected growth and stock market returns between country i and k 
widens. This effect may indicate that countries that are likely to come up with more investment 
opportunities (with higher expected growth and higher returns) attract more foreign venture capitalists 
on the one hand and on the other hand the venture capitalists located in these countries invest less 
often abroad. The number and volume of net cross-border inflows decrease when the difference in the 
stock market capitalization between countries i and k increases. This effect supports the view that 
viable stock markets are important for venture capitalists’ fundraising. Being located in countries with 
viable stock markets facilitates the fund raising process for venture capitalists; the funds are then 
invested in promising portfolio companies located at home and abroad.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The tax and legal environment also influences net cross-border inflows. The expected impact of the 
VC indicator on net cross-border flows is unclear (see hypothesis 3) since it combines the tax and 
legal environment relevant for the venture capital demand and supply. Our results suggest that the VC 
indicator (lower value is advantageous) has a negative impact on net cross-border inflows indicating 
that a poor environment prevents foreign venture capitalists from investing in a country. The VC-
supply indicator (lower value is advantageous) is expected to have a positive effect on net cross-
border inflows since it is relevant for the supply only. The difference in the VC-supply indicator 
between country i and k has the expected positive effect on the number and volume of net cross-
border inflows. This positive coefficient suggests that countries with less favorable environments for 
venture capital intermediation receive more venture capital from abroad than the venture capitalists 
located in these countries invest abroad.  
In Columns (4)-(5) and (9)-(10) of Table 6 we put particular emphasis on those country pairs for which 
no deal in either direction has occurred. By construction, the net cross-border inflows between 
countries i and k can either be positive, negative or zero. In our sample, 508 of the 1,224 country-pair-
year observations are equal to zero because no cross-border investments in either direction have 
taken place. A two-step selection model (Heckman 1979) helps us to account for the possibility that 
the existence and the size of cross-border flows are driven by different processes. In the selection 
regression (results not depicted) we estimate the inverse Mills ratio, which we then include as an 
additional RHS variable in the outcome regression. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 150 
replications to control for the fact that the inverse Mills ratio is a generated regressor. In the selection 
regression the dependent variable is equal to one when we observe cross-border flows between 
country i and k at least in one direction, and zero otherwise. As RHS variables we use the differences 
in the economic determinants between the two countries, country and year dummy variables and the 
cultural and geographical proximity between country i and k. As the results in Columns (4)-(5) and (9)-
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(10) show, the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are insignificant at conventional significance levels 
in the outcome regression indicating that a selection bias does not seem to be relevant in this context.  
In Columns (5) and (10) we additionally tackle another issue, namely the choice of country dummy 
variables. In Columns (1)-(4) and (6)-(9) we include country dummy variables which are equal to one 
when the country is either country i or country k. Since we have 17 countries, we include 16 country 
dummy variables, leaving one country (the United States) as the reference country. In Columns (5) 
and (10), we follow a different approach: we include dummy variables for both countries (i and k) 
separately, i.e. we generate 17 country i and 17 country k dummy variables. As an example, for net 
cross-border inflows between Austria (country i) and the United States (country k), the Austrian 
country i dummy variable is equal to one for Austria and equal to zero for the United States, while the 
US country k dummy variable is equal to one for the United States and equal to zero for Austria.3 As 
the estimation results in Columns (5) and (10) show, including country i as well as country k dummy 
variables instead of simple country dummies does not substantially change our estimation results on 
how economic determinants affect net cross-border inflows.  
4.3 Dynamics in net cross-border inflows by country pairs 
Finally, we test dynamic responses in net cross-border inflows by country pairs. There are several 
reasons to expect such dynamic responses underlying net cross-border inflows: (i) Countries that 
have more promising investment opportunities than other countries and therefore attract more foreign 
venture capitalists in one year, are more likely to also offer more promising investment opportunities in 
the following year. (ii) It is unlikely that all promising investment opportunities in a country will vanish 
within a short time because transaction costs that arise when carrying out cross-border investments 
may hinder venture capitalists to fully equalize expected return differences between countries 
instantly. (iii) Herding behavior among venture capitalists might be another reason that motivates 
dynamic responses in net cross-border inflows. (iv) Venture capital funds are often specialized, i.e. 
they focus on investments in one country or one region. Since this specialization is a part of their fund 
strategy, which they have bindingly declared towards their limited partners, switching to other 
countries or regions is impossible or at least very costly from the fund's perspective. However, even 
funds that are not bindingly specialized may exhibit a certain persistence in their country portfolio 
structure by continuing to invest in those countries in which they have built up know-how and 
experience. Certainly, venture capitalists may gain experience in new regions and raise funds 
designed for investments in these regions; this, however, takes time. (v) Finally, some of the 
persistence may result from the fact that venture capitalists typically provide capital in stages and thus 
repeatedly invest in the same portfolio company and in the same country.    
To test for dynamic responses, we extend the model used in the last subsection by including a lag of 
dependent variables and by modeling a fixed effect for each of the 136 country pairs. The fixed effects 
for country pairs resolve problems otherwise arising from unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in 
                                                 
3  However, given the construction of the net cross-border inflows, some country i and k dummy variables 
experience no or little variation over our sample. For example, the US country i dummy variable and the 
Austrian country k dummy variable are never equal to one. Therefore, we include only 13 country i and 13 
country k dummy variables. 
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bilateral country relationships, which might influence net cross-border inflows, such as the protection 
of shareholders. We use the dynamic panel-data estimator (which is a generalized method of 
moments estimator) proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and a finite sample correction proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005). The estimation results will be consistent if we use appropriate instruments for the 
lagged dependent variable, and if there is no second-order or higher-order autocorrelation. Therefore, 
we test for overidentifying restrictions (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998).  
In Table 7 we present the estimation results for the number and volume of net cross-border inflows.  
The test results on overidentifying restrictions and autocorrelation fully verify our modeling approach. 
The lagged dependent variable has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant for the 
number and volume of net cross-border inflows. Thus, higher net cross-border inflows in the previous 
year even lead to higher net cross-border inflows in the current year. The signs and significance levels 
of some economic determinants are even contained in this dynamic specification of the model, which 
includes a fixed effect for each country pair, similar to the results in the static specification presented 
in Table 6. The difference in the stock market capitalization has a significantly negative effect, while 
the difference in expected growth has a significantly positive effect on net cross-border inflows.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.4 Extensions and robustness 
There is an on-going debate as to whether investments by governmental authorities influence the level 
of venture capital investments in a country. Investments by governments may positively affect the size 
of the venture capital industry in the case of positive externalities (see Gebhardt and Schmidt 2002, 
Lerner 2002), while they may have a negative impact in the case of adverse incentives on deal 
selection and monitoring (see Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2001, Murray and Marriot 1998). Several 
empirical studies investigate the relationship between venture capital investments and governmental 
activities. For instance, Leleux and Surlemont (2003) analyze whether funds offered by public 
authorities seed the venture capital industry or whether they crowd out private funds. Their results 
support neither the seeding nor the crowding-out hypothesis. Armour and Cumming (2006) do not find 
governmental venture capital investments to be significantly related to early- and expansion-stage 
investments. Da Rin et al. (2006) analyze whether public R&D expenditures influence the fraction of 
venture capital allocated to early-stage companies. They do not observe a significant link between 
public R&D expenditures and the ratio of early-stage investments.  
We follow this literature and extend the models presented in Tables 5 – 7 by an additional regressor 
that captures how much venture capital government authorities provide. We use (i) the investments by 
the government relative to total investments in each country and (ii) new funds provided by the 
government for venture capital investments relative to total new funds raised in each country. We 
employ both variables since the correlation between investments and new funds by the government is 
only moderate (the correlation coefficient is 0.3). In these extended models, we find that governmental 
venture capital is not significantly related to domestic investments, which is in line with the findings by 
Armour and Cumming (2006). New funds provided by the government have a significant negative 
effect on gross cross-border inflows, but they do not affect net cross-border inflows. On the contrary, 
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investments by the government have no effect on gross cross-border inflows, but net cross-border 
inflows increase through governmental venture capital investments. Thus, our results on the role of 
governmental venture capital are not clear-cut. However, in these various extensions, the signs and 
significance levels of the other variables remain unchanged when we include governmental venture 
capital.  
As a robustness test, we exclude the United States and United Kingdom from the sample because 
these economies are much more market-based than the rest of our sample in terms of market 
capitalization as well as turnover (e.g., Beck and Levine 2002) and because venture capital industries 
in these countries differ in their size and structure from the other countries. Moreover, the United 
Kingdom played a specific role in the venture capital and private equity internationalization process in 
the past. US investors, such as Advent, General Atlantic, and Benchmark, used the United Kingdom to 
systematically enter European industries in the boom phase at the end of the 1990s (Hardymon et al. 
2003). Since syndicating with domestic investors started to play a key role, the expertise brought from 
the United States to the United Kingdom may have changed the business model of British venture 
capitalists. Our estimation results from Tables 5 – 7, however, do not depend on whether or not the 
United States and the United Kingdom are included in the analyses.  
5 Summary and concluding remarks 
We used a dataset of venture capital investments in European and North-American countries to 
investigate the economic determinants of net cross-border venture capital inflows for country pairs. 
Net cross-border inflows are positive when a country attracts more venture capital finance from 
another country than it invests there. Our results on net cross-border inflows can be summed up as 
follows: Countries with higher expected growth and lagged stock market returns receive larger net 
cross-border inflows. This result suggests that venture capital investments originate in countries with a 
low venture capital demand and target countries with a high demand. Moreover, countries with a 
higher stock market capitalization have lower net cross-border inflows than countries with a low stock 
market capitalization. This finding may indicate that venture capitalists located in countries with viable 
stock markets can raise funds at more favorable conditions than venture capitalists located in 
countries with poor stock markets. The tax and legal environments for venture capital intermediation 
also plays a decisive role: Countries with poor environments receive higher net cross-border inflows 
than countries with favorable environments. This last finding may suggest that venture capitalists 
located in countries with attractive tax and legal environments for venture capital intermediation have 
incentives to invest their funds in jurisdictions with less favorable tax and legal conditions, since they 
possess comparative advantages over local investors there. Last but not least, we also documented 
dynamic responses in net cross-border inflows: The past values of net cross-border inflows positively 
affect their current values. This positive effect may be due to transaction costs or informational 
asymmetries when venture capitalists exploit expected return differences between potential 
investment opportunities in different countries. However, it may also reflect herding behavior in cross-
border venture capital investments or other typical features of venture capital finance, such as round 
financing or fund specialization.  
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For policy makers who aim at establishing viable venture capital industries our research analysis 
offers several important insights. (i) The internationalization in venture capital finance that started in 
the mid 1990s may help to improve the availability of venture capital in a country. (ii) Cross-border 
venture capital inflows partly compensate for unfavorable conditions that local venture capitalists face 
in countries with unviable stock markets or unfavorable tax and legal conditions for venture capital 
intermediation. (iii) The most relevant factors for high venture capital investment activity, both for 
domestic and for foreign venture capitalists, seem to be the innovativeness and the economic 
prosperity of a country. Thus, policy makers in countries where venture capital finance is less 
developed should aim at creating public policies that endorse innovative entrepreneurs and the 
country’s economic prospects. Such policies may act as a boost for new domestic venture capitalists 
as well as help attract foreign investors.  
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Table 1 
Venture capital investment data 
 
Panel a – Domestic investments, inflows and outflows by countries 
 AUS BEL CN DEN FIN FRA GER IRE IT NET NOR POR ES SD SW UK US 
Domestic investments                  
   Number  81 207 1,109 156 194 1,406 802 109 253 266 107 54 669 643 56 2,497 10,263 
   Volume (in billion Euros)  0.38 1.29 4.05 0.56 1.84 22.18 6.94 0.31 6.83 2.33 0.47 2.22 12.62 4.99 0.40 13.48 128.18 
                  
Gross cross-border inflows (from all sample countries) 
   Number 86 183 652 187 191 839 663 201 348 246 149 66 227 366 245 2,233 2,926 
   Volume (in billion Euros) 0.90 3.26 7.20 1.48 1.60 27.34 12.63 1.25 11.90 7.64 2.58 2.13 11.67 3.86 2.16 24.77 37.01 
                  
Gross cross-border outflows (from all sample countries) 
   Number  22 315 521 169 79 521 1,342 66 77 503 127 21 52 266 800 2,171 2,756 
   Volume (in billion Euros) 0.07 6.90 6.52 1.38 0.44 6.36 22.96 0.50 2.71 4.68 0.86 1.21 1.72 2.49 9.47 33.39 57.72 
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Panel b – Gross cross-border inflows by country pairs (in million Euros) 
 Country in which the venture capitalist is located 
Country of the company AUS BEL CN DEN FIN FRA GER IRE IT NET NOR POR ES SD SW UK US Total 
Austria  3 0 3 0 4 453 3 8 20 0 0 0 0 86 145 176 901 
Belgium 0  0 18 0 262 126 0 4 381 0 0 0 0 26 407 2,032 3,255 
Canada 0 0 49 31 56 81 15 0 125 16 0 18 8 123 774 5,909 7,205 
Denmark 0 9 0 91 70 89 0 0 59 53 0 0 158 105 487 363 1,483 
Finland 0 122 4 37 20 361 0 4 21 3 0 0 166 30 251 579 15,96 
France 6 3,439 102 40 0 2,893 52 40 495 7 4 1,105 75 361 6,122 12,603 27,344 
Germany 42 91 1 85 3 253 0 773 669 14 2 23 48 995 2,843 6,785 12,626 
Ireland 0 23 19 0 0 33 84 0 13 0 0 0 18 54 549 461 1,254 
Italy 0 53 10 0 0 593 1,283 18  127 10 0 0 0 505 4,179 5,118 11,896 
Netherlands 0 607 14 11 6 913 228 0 1,442 0 5 8 9 176 976 3,251 7,644 
Norway 0 4 0 14 27 46 36 0 3 22 0 0 104 56 686 1,580 2,578 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 15 616 0 0 225 0 320 0 339 379 239 2,133 
Spain 0 1,439 0 0 0 900 2,872 0 17 141 0 1,166 24 135 1,858 3,123 11,675 
Sweden 0 8 8 149 156 51 1,796 0 0 86 121 0 0 108 636 740 3,860 
Switzerland 0 128 75 10 3 211 513 0 12 57 68 0 12 24 633 413 2,160 
United Kingdom 22 310 868 246 25 844 5,800 358 147 577 182 4 93 127 816 14,351 24,769 
United States 5 666 5,420 722 102 2,090 5,729 51 260 1,663 383 31 144 1,731 5,555 12,463  37,014 
      
Total 75 6902 6,519 1,383 444 6,362 22,960 497 2,709 4,682 855 1,212 1,722 2,492 9,469 33,386 57,722  
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Panel c – Net cross-border inflows by country pairs (in million Euros) 
  Country i  receives net cross-border inflows (+) from, or originates net cross-border outflows (-) to, the following countries 
  
Country i 
Country k 
AUS 
 
BEL CN DEN FIN FRA GER IRE 
 
IT NET NOR POR ES SD SW UK 
 
US 
 
Austria  -3 0 -3 0 2 -411 -3 -8 -20 0 0 0 0 -86 -123 -171 
Belgium 3 0 -9 122 3178 -35 23 50 225 4 0 1,439 8 102 -97 -1,365 
Canada 0 0 -49 -27 45 -80 4 10 -111 -16 0 -18 0 -48 94 -489 
Denmark 3 9 49  -55 -30 -4 0 0 -48 -39 0 0 -9 -95 -241 359 
Finland 0 -122 27 55 -20 -358 0 -4 -15 24 0 0 -10 -26 -225 -477 
France -2 -3,178 -45 30 20  -2,640 -19 552 418 39 11 -205 -24 -150 -5,278 -10,513 
Germany 411 35 80 4 358 2,640 84 510 -441 23 614 2,849 1,748 -481 2,957 -1,057 
Ireland 3 -23 -4 0 0 19 -84  18 -13 0 0 0 -18 -54 -191 -410 
Italy 8 -50 -10 0 4 -552 -510 -18 1,314 -7 0 17 0 -492 -4,032 -4,858 
Netherlands 20 -225 111 48 15 -418 441 13 -1,314  22 220 133 78 -119 -399 -1,588 
Norway 0 -4 16 39 -24 -39 -23 0 7 -22  0 0 17 12 -504 -1,197 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 -11 -614 0 0 -220 0  846 0 -339 -375 -208 
Spain 0 -1,439 18 0 0 205 -2,849 0 -17 -133 0 -846  -24 -124 -1,765 -2,979 
Sweden 0 -8 0 9 10 24 -1,748 18 0 -78 -17 0 24  -84 -509 991 
Switzerland 86 -102 48 95 26 150 481 54 492 119 -12 339 124 84  183 5,142 
United Kingdom 123 97 -94 241 225 5,278 -2,957 191 4,032 399 504 375 1,765 509 -183  -1,888 
 
 
 
 
 
Country k 
receives net 
cross-border 
inflows (-) from 
or originates 
net cross-
border 
outflows (+) to 
the following 
countries  
United States 171 1,365 489 -359 477 10,513 1,057 410 4,858 1,588 1,197 208 2,979 -991 -5,142 1,888  
Note: The number and volume of venture capital investments in 17 countries is aggregated over the period 2000-2008. Panel a provides information on domestic investments (the 
venture capitalist is located in the same country as the portfolio company), gross cross-border inflows (only the portfolio company, but not the venture capitalist, is located in the 
country under focus) and gross cross-border outflows (only the venture capitalist, but not the company, is located in the country under focus) at the country level. Panel b depicts gross 
cross-border inflows for country pairs. Panel c depicts net cross-border inflows for country pairs defined as investments attracted by country i from venture capitalists located in country 
k minus investments attracted by k from i. All figures are based on the Zephyr database.  
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
Note: Summary statistics for the dependent and RHS variables are based on annual data from 17 European and North-American countries. The mean of net cross-border inflows is 
based on 136 of the total 272 country pairs in our dataset since net cross-border inflows from country i to k equal the negative net cross-border inflows from country k to i. The mean 
net cross-border inflows based on all country pairs is, obviously, equal to zero. 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Description 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Domestic investments (the venture capitalist is located in the same country as the portfolio company) 
    Number 4.209 0.809 log(1+number of domestic investments normalized by GDP in trillion Euros) 
    Volume 6.077 1.090 log(1+volume of domestic investments normalized by GDP in million Euros)  
Gross cross-border inflows (the portfolio company but not the venture capitalist is located in the country under focus) 
    Number 4.123 0.767 log(1+number of foreign investments normalized by GDP in trillion Euros)  
    Volume 6.627 1.004 log(1+volume of foreign investments normalized by GDP in million Euros)  
Net cross-border inflows (investments attracted by country i from venture capitalists located in country k minus investments attracted by k from i) 
    Number -0.105 0.853 log(1+number normalized by GDP in trillion Euros) from i to k minus log(1+number normalized by GDP in trillion Euros) from k to i. 
    Volume -0.264 1.886 log(1+volume normalized by GDP in thousand Euros) from i to k minus log(1+volume normalized by GDP in thousand Euros) from k to i. 
    
Panel B: RHS variables    
Economic environment 
Patents 3.639 2.454 Number of patents granted to residents relative to country's GDP in trillion Euros. Source: www.wipo.int/ipstats/fr/statistics/patents; 
www.worldbank.org  
Expected growth  0.025 0.009 Expected growth of real GDP over next 3 to 5 years. Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
Returns 0.106 0.286 Annual stock market returns calculated from MSCI performance indexes in Euros. Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
Capitalization 0.986 0.609 Stock market capitalization relative to GDP. Source: www.worldbank.org  
VC indicator 1.789 0.430 Total score of the EVCA Benchmarking Reports. The value of the indicator between 2000-02 (2003-05; 2006-08) comes from the EVCA 
Benchmarking Report 2003 (EVCA 2004; EVCA 2006). Lower value of indicator is better. Source: EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, EVCA 2006 
VC-supply indicator 1.438 0.468 Subscore from the EVCA Benchmarking Reports including tax transparency for domestic investors, ability to avoid VAT on management 
fees and carried interest, freedom from undue restrictions, taxation of carried interest. The value of the indicator between 2000-02 (2003-
05; 2006-08) comes from the EVCA Benchmarking Report 2003 (EVCA 2004; EVCA 2006). Lower value of indicator is better. Source: 
EVCA 2003, EVCA 2004, EVCA 2006 
Cultural and geographical proximity 
Same law 0.221  Dummy variable equal to one if the two countries have the same legal tradition based on French, German, English or Scandinavian law. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Same language 0.147  Dummy variable equal to one if the same language is spoken in the two countries. Source: www.cepii.fr  
Log of distance  7.341 0.916 The logarithm of the distance between the two countries in kilometers. Source: www.cepii.fr  
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Table 3 
Correlation between variables 
Panel a – Country-level data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Patents in previous year 1      
(2) Expected growth 0.14* 1     
(3) Returns in previous year 0.07 0.33* 1    
(4) Capitalization in previous year 0.11 0.03 0.14* 1   
(5) VC indicator 0.13 -0.11 0.02 -0.25* 1  
(6) VC-supply indicator -0.07 -0.24* -0.02 -0.41* 0.55* 1 
 Country dummies       
 Austria 0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.28* 0.26* 0.51* 
 Belgium -0.18* -0.16* -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.07 
 Canada -0.22* 0.22* 0.07 0.08 -0.46* -0.22* 
 Denmark -0.29* -0.03 0.04 -0.14* 0.06 0.00 
 Finland 0.35* 0.22* 0.10 0.21* 0.21* -0.07 
 France 0.22* -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 
 Germany 0.22* -0.16* -0.01 -0.19* 0.30* 0.22* 
 Ireland -0.12 0.28* -0.06 -0.14* -0.19* -0.22* 
 Italy 0.02 -0.24* -0.04 -0.19* 0.03 0.15* 
 Netherlands 0.06 -0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.22* 
 Norway -0.16* 0.23* 0.01 -0.18* 0.16* -0.22* 
 Portugal -0.31* -0.16* -0.04 -0.22* 0.09 0.29* 
 Spain -0.15* 0.13* 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.37* 
 Sweden 0.37* 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.17* -0.22* 
 Switzerland -0.19* -0.23* -0.05 0.67* 0.07 -0.07 
 United Kingdom -0.18* -0.00 -0.05 0.21* -0.28* -0.22* 
 United States 0.47* 0.09 -0.07 0.18* -0.46* -0.22* 
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Panel b – Country-pair data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1)  Patents in previous year 1         
(2)  Expected Growth 0.07* 1        
(3)  Returns in previous year 0.05* 0.10* 1       
(4)  Capitalization in previous year 0.08* 0.02 0.15* 1      
(5)  VC indicator 0.11* -0.23* 0.06* -0.22* 1     
(6)  VC-supply indicator -0.07* -0.35* -0.03 -0.37* 0.51* 1    
(7) Same law 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.07* 0.12* 0.14* 1   
(8) Same language 0.08* -0.11* -0.02 0.19* 0.09* -0.02 0.38* 1  
(9) Log of distance  0.25* -0.07* -0.07* -0.16* -0.01 0.14* -0.26* -0.15* 1 
 Country dummies          
 Austria -0.12* 0.10* -0.05 0.18* -0.22* -0.47* -0.08* 0.04 -0.03 
 Belgium 0.12* 0.19* 0.10* -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.08* 0.24 -0.22* 
 Canada 0.16* -0.18* -0.04 -0.17* 0.43* 0.21* -0.03 0.23* 0.49* 
 Denmark 0.20* 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.05* 0.05* -0.03 -0.15* -0.09* 
 Finland -0.16* -0.14* -0.07* -0.22* -0.04 0.10* -0.03 -0.09* 0.07* 
 France -0.10* 0.02 0.01 -0.10* 0.06* 0.03 0.08* 0.04 -0.16* 
 Germany -0.10* 0.04 0.01 -0.05* -0.04 -0.02 -0.08* 0.04 -0.20* 
 Ireland -0.03 -0.05* 0.02 -0.06* 0.06* 0.07* -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
 Italy -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.05* 0.04 0.04 0.08* -0.09* 0.04 
 Netherlands -0.04 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08* -0.09* -0.21* 
 Norway -0.09* 0.07* 0.06* -0.09* 0.08* 0.02 -0.03 -0.15* -0.03 
 Portugal -0.13* -0.08* -0.01 -0.10* 0.05* 0.19* 0.08* -0.15* 0.13* 
 Spain -0.06* 0.08* 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.22* 0.08* -0.15* 0.06* 
 Sweden 0.24* 0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.11* -0.12* -0.03 -0.09* -0.01 
 Switzerland -0.16* -0.21* -0.04 0.52* 0.03 -0.02 -0.08* 0.23* -0.12* 
 United Kingdom -0.14* 0.01 -0.04 0.09* -0.27* -0.14* -0.03 0.04 -0.15* 
 United States 0.48* 0.12* -0.07* 0.06* -0.45* -0.14* -0.03 0.04 0.48* 
Note: Panel a is based on 17 countries whereas Panel b includes variables for country-pair data. All variables are 
defined in Table 2.  is the difference between country i and k.  * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4 
Tests on equality of means 
 
Panel a –Domestic investments 
 Mean number  Mean volume  
X Median > X Median < X mean test Median > X Median < X mean test 
Patents 4.24 4.18 0.47 6.27 5.89   2.14** 
Expected Growth 4.52 3.91     5.03*** 6.23 5.94 1.67* 
Returns 4.20 4.22 -0.11 6.24 5.92 1.83* 
Capitalization 4.53 3.89       5.36*** 6.44 5.72     4.28*** 
VC indicator 4.13 4.28 -1.14 5.92 6.23 -1.77* 
VC-supply indicator 3.83 4.40 -4.63 6.09 6.07 0.11 
 
 
Panel b – Gross cross-border inflows in country i 
 Mean number  Mean volume  
X Median > X Median < X mean test Median > X Median < X mean test 
Patents 3.98 4.27 -2.35** 6.57 6.68 -0.71 
Expected Growth 4.30 3.95    2.88*** 6.70 6.56 0.85 
Returns 4.21 4.03 1.46 6.79 6.47   1.95* 
Capitalization 4.32 3.94     3.31*** 6.82 6.44    2.41** 
VC indicator 4.07 4.18 -0.85 6.53 6.72 -1.18 
VC-supply indicator 3.56 4.40   -7.01*** 6.45 7.71 -1.33 
 
 
Panel c – Net cross-border inflows by country pairs  
 Mean number  Mean volume  
X (i minus k) Median > X Median < X mean test Median > X Median < X mean test 
 Patents -0.09 -0.11 0.41 -0.36 -0.17 -1.71* 
 Expected Growth 0.06 -0.28      7.02*** -0.01 -0.53     4.92*** 
 Returns -0.07 -0.14 1.38 -0.18 -0.35 1.61* 
 Capitalization -0.28 0.07      -7.28*** -0.68 0.16    -7.98*** 
 VC indicator -0.08 -0.14 1.25 -0.18 -0.34 1.49 
 VC-supply indicator -0.06 -0.16    2.06** -0.08 -0.48     3.79*** 
Note: The results of mean tests are with unequal variances; the data in our sample are separated according to 
whether the economic determinant of a country is above or below the median value of the sample. All variables 
are defined in Table 2.  is the difference between country i and k (i minus k). ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows  
 Domestic investments in country i  
 Number Volume 
Patents in the previous year 0.145** 0.127* 0.123* -0.195* -0.168 -0.148 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.109) (0.113) (0.115) 
Expected growth 7.925 6.809 7.697 10.735 12.404 11.228 
 (5.581) (5.663) (5.570) (9.471) (9.618) (9.433) 
Returns in the previous year -0.282* -0.26 -0.256 0.416 0.383 0.361 
 (0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.266) (0.268) (0.268) 
Capitalization in the previous year 0.740*** 0.758*** 0.726*** 0.784*** 0.756** 0.814*** 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.177) (0.301) (0.302) (0.301) 
VC indicator (lower is better)  0.196   -0.293  
  (0.188)   (0.319)  
VC-supply indicator (lower is better)   0.204   -0.441 
   (0.212)   (0.360) 
       
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 
R2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.6 0.61 0.61 
F test 19.21 18.62 18.59 9.76 9.46 9.52 
       
 Gross cross-border inflows in country i  
 Number Volume 
Patents in the previous year 0.141* 0.138* 0.150* 0.034 0.083 0.079 
 (0.073) (0.076) (0.078) (0.141) (0.145) (0.149) 
Expected growth 10.865* 10.705 10.960* 7.004 10.014 7.471 
 (6.383) (6.499) (6.386) (12.233) (12.390) (12.212) 
Returns in the previous year 0.11 0.113 0.1 0.2 0.141 0.148 
 (0.179) (0.181) (0.182) (0.344) (0.345) (0.348) 
Capitalization in the previous year 0.364* 0.367* 0.370* 0.853** 0.804** 0.882** 
 (0.203) (0.204) (0.203) (0.389) (0.389) (0.389) 
VC indicator (lower is better)  0.028   -0.528  
  (0.215)   (0.410)  
VC-supply indicator (lower is better)   -0.085   -0.417 
   (0.244)   (0.466) 
       
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 
F test 11.21 10.77 10.78 1.84 1.85 1.81 
R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Note: Estimation results are from seemingly unrelated regressions for annual domestic investments and gross 
cross-border inflows based on 17 countries and the period 2000-2008. The equation system looks like: 
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
DD Patents Growth Returns Capitalization VC
CB Patents Growth Returns Capitalization VC
      
      
   
   
      
       , 
where DD denotes the domestic investments (the venture capitalist and portfolio company are located in 
country i) and CB denotes gross cross-border inflows (the portfolio company but not the venture capitalist is 
located in country i) in year t normalized by GDP and logarithmized. All variables are defined in Table 2. Country 
and year dummy variables are included. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Net cross-border inflows for country pairs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Number Volume 
 Patents in the previous year 0.009 0.021** 0.009 0.010 0.023 -0.032° 0.003 -0.029° -0.028 -0.022 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.02) (0.021) (0.02) (0.023) (0.035) 
 Expected growth 0.118*** 0.108*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.057** 0.189*** 0.162*** 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.147** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.048) (0.063) 
 Returns in the previous year 0.300*** 0.316*** 0.298*** 0.287*** 0.247*** 0.459*** 0.501*** 0.451*** 0.439** 0.501*** 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.096) (0.095) (0.176) (0.178) (0.173) (0.182) (0.185) 
 Capitalization in the previous year -0.364*** -0.394*** -0.328*** -0.319*** -0.276*** -0.602*** -0.684*** -0.510*** -0.500*** -0.581*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.072) (0.091) (0.089) (0.093) (0.093) (0.166) 
 VC indicator (lower is better)  -0.208***     -0.572***    
  (0.055)     (0.121)    
 VC-supply indicator (lower is better)   0.182*** 0.181*** 0.135*   0.455*** 0.454*** 0.276° 
   (0.052) (0.053) (0.077)   (0.119) (0.124) (0.177) 
Inverse Mills ratio    0.052 0.006    0.061 -0.161° 
    (0.053) (0.049)    (0.108) (0.107) 
           
Country dummies yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes  
i-country and k-country dummies     yes     yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
           
Observations 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 
F test 9.81 10.46 10.07   8.24 8.73 8.43   
2    314.34 457.03    328.57 522.10 
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.174 0.175 0.175 0.248 0.135 0.146 0.145 0.145 0.247 
Note: OLS estimation results for annual net cross-border inflows between 136 country pairs for the period 2000-2008. The model is given as follows: 
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1ikt ikt ikt ikt ikt ikt iktNCB Patents Growth Returns Capitalization VC                      
where NCB denotes net cross-border inflows defined as investments attracted by country i from k minus investments originated by i in k in year t normalized by GDP and 
logarithmized. Net cross-border inflows are positive when country i attracts more investments from k than it originates there.  is the difference between country i and k (i minus k). All 
variables are defined in Table 2. In Columns (1)-(4) and (6)-(9), 16 country dummy variables are included, while Columns (5) and (10) include 13 i- country and 13 k-country dummies. 
Year dummy variables are employed in all models. In Columns (4)-(5) and (9)-(10) the inverse Mills ratio from a first stage regression (whether or not any cross-border investments are 
observed in either direction) is included. This first stage model (results not depicted) includes the same RHS variables plus a dummy variable for the same law tradition and language, 
and the geographical distance between the two countries. White (1980)-heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. In Columns (4)-(5) and (9)-(10) 
bootstrapped standard errors with 150 replications are presented. ***, **, *,  ° denote significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Dynamics in net cross-border inflows for country pairs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Number Volume 
Lagged dependent variable 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.225*** 0.117** 0.118** 0.119** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.072) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
 Patents in previous year 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.001 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 Expected growth  0.107*** 0.096*** 0.118*** 0.210*** 0.203*** 0.235*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.064) (0.065) (0.072) 
 Returns in previous year 0.049 0.080 0.024 -0.230 -0.209 -0.281 
 (0.157) (0.166) (0.161) (0.325) (0.347) (0.341) 
 Capitalization in previous year -0.226*** -0.244*** -0.202*** -0.638*** -0.646*** -0.587***
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.059) (0.112) (0.114) (0.122) 
 VC indicator (lower is better)   -0.107*   -0.058  
  (0.055)   (0.129)  
 VC-supply indicator (lower is better)   0.073   0.132 
   (0.054)   (0.128) 
       
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 
Number of country pairs 136 136 136 136 136 136 
F test 9.85 9.66 11.53 6.93 6.48 7.57 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.793 0.731 0.823 0.151 0.166 0.139 
Number of instruments 29 30 30 29 30 30 
AR 1 (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR 2 (p-value) 0.467 0.453 0.472 0.277 0.277 0.272 
AR 3 (p-value) 0.824 0.826 0.824 0.427 0.428 0.421 
Note: Estimation results from Blundell/Bond(1998)-GMM estimations with absolute Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected 
standard errors in parentheses are from the following model: 
0 1 1 2 1 3 4 1
5 1 6 1
ikt ikt ikt ikt ikt
ikt ikt ikt
NCB NCB Patents Growth Returns
Capitalization VC u
    
 
  
 
        
    , 
where NCB denotes net cross-border inflows by country pairs defined as investments attracted by country i from 
country k minus investments originated by country i in country k in year t normalized by GDP and logarithmized.  
is the difference between country i and k. Positive values of net cross-border inflows imply more investments 
being attracted to than originated from country i to country k (i minus k). All variables are defined in Table 2. The 
lagged dependent variable is instrumented using past values. Year dummy variables are employed in all models. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Panel a – Domestic investments (one-country setting) 
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Panel b – Cross-border investments and demand differences (two-country setting) 
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Panel c – Cross-border investments and supply differences (two-country setting) 
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Fig. 1. Domestic and cross-border investments. Panel a shows how differences in the supply and demand 
conditions in a closed economy determine the quantity of venture capital finance, Q, and the risk-adjusted 
expected return, R in equilibrium. Panel b (Panel c) shows the impact of differences in the demand (supply) on 
cross-border investments in a two-country setting. 
